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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of pyramid ownership structure and multiple controlling
shareholders on ﬁrm leverage. Pyramids, having at least one controlling shareholder and a
subsidiary, rely signiﬁcantly more on debt ﬁnancing than non-pyramid ﬁrms. Moreover, higher
leverage is observed in pyramids where the second controlling shareholders have more voting
rights. We also ﬁnd that the disparity between the voting rights of the ﬁrst two controlling
shareholders is negatively related to ﬁrm leverage. Interestingly, the inﬂuence of the second
controlling shareholder is only present in non-family controlled pyramids. Overall, the results are
consistent with the view that controlling shareholders in pyramids use debt to secure their private
beneﬁts.
JEL classiﬁcation: G31, G32
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial markets; International topics
Résumé
Les auteures étudient l’incidence de la structure de propriété pyramidale et de la présence de
plusieurs actionnaires dominants sur le levier ﬁnancier des sociétés. Les pyramides, qui comptent
au moins un actionnaire dominant et une ﬁliale, se ﬁnancent beaucoup plus par emprunt que les
autres types de société. Le recours au levier ﬁnancier est encore plus marqué lorsque les
deuxièmes actionnaires en importance ont davantage de droits de vote que les premiers. Les
auteures constatent aussi que l’écart entre les droits de vote des deux principaux actionnaires est
inversement lié au levier ﬁnancier des sociétés. Fait intéressant, les deuxièmes actionnaires n’ont
d’inﬂuence que dans les pyramides qui ne sont pas contrôlées par une famille. Dans l’ensemble,
les résultats sont conformes au point de vue selon lequel les actionnaires dominants au sein des
pyramides utilisent l’emprunt pour servir leurs intérêts privés.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G31, G32
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Marchés ﬁnanciers; Questions internationales1 Introduction
There is a substantial literature examining the disciplinary role of debt in widely held
¯rms (for example, Berger et al. (1997), Lang et al. (1991), Gul and Tsui (1998), Maloney
et al. (1993)).1 However, there are a few studies on the role of debt in pyramid ¯rms
where ultimate owners (controlling shareholders) have direct or indirect ownership in
a large number of companies (Manos et al. (2007) and Bianco and Nicodano (2006)).2
Debt may not be an e®ective disciplinary device in pyramid ¯rms as it is in stand-alone
¯rms due to the complexity of the ownership structure and the risk of expropriation
of outsiders by controlling shareholders in pyramids. The wedge between control and
cash °ow rights of controlling shareholders in pyramid ¯rms may create severe risk of
expropriation (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)).3
This paper investigates how pyramid ownership structure and the presence of multi-
ple controlling shareholders a®ect ¯rms' choices about capital structure. Pyramid ¯rms
are pervasive. In a sample of publicly listed companies in G7 countries, 35% of the ¯rms
are in pyramids controlled by ultimate owners with more than 20% voting rights. Isolat-
1High debt levels may be used to constrain managers from diverting free cash °ow to pursue personal
goals at the expense of value maximization (Jensen (1986)).
2In this paper pyramid ¯rm is de¯ned as a ¯rm having a controlling shareholder with direct or indirect
control over a chain of companies at the 20% level. We use ultimate owners, controlling shareholders,
and large shareholders interchangeably.
3Pyramids di®er from stand-alone ¯rms in two important ways. First, unlike stand-alone ¯rms with
dispersed ownership in which the main agency problem is between managers and shareholders, the main
agency problem in pyramid ¯rms is between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders,
and various stakeholders (La Porta et al. (1999), Faccio and Lang (2002), and Claessens et al. (2006)).
Second, the unique and complex control chain of pyramid structure allows controlling shareholders
to tunnel (expropriate) resources among a±liated ¯rms to extract private bene¯ts. Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2003) describe several forms of tunneling. For example, it may occur through di®erential
interest rates, non-e±cient transfer pricing and/or leasing of assets. See Bertrand et al. (2002), Morck
et al. (2005), Johnson et al. (2000), and Faccio et al. (2003) for details on this practice.
1ing the e®ect of typical factors that explain cross-sectional variation in capital structures,
pyramid ¯rms have signi¯cantly higher leverage ratio than non-pyramid ¯rms. Higher
debt ratios in pyramid ¯rms could be potentially consistent with several explanations.
Our results suggest that debt is used by controlling shareholders to facilitate expropri-
ation, rather than to enhance control, signal avoidance of empire building, or reduce
taxes. Particularly, pyramid ¯rms have lower leverage in countries with stronger pro-
tection of creditor rights, where expropriation by using debt is expected to be more
costly. In addition, pyramids with higher asymmetric information, where expropriation
is harder to be discovered, use more debt. Moreover, pyramid ¯rms have higher leverage
than stand-alone ¯rms when controlled by the same ultimate owners.
Controlling shareholders in pyramids may use debt to facilitate expropriation by
forcing their subsidiaries to raise a large fraction of external debt, reshu²ing it through
intercompany transactions without being easily detected by outsiders and ¯nally de-
ploying the resources for their own preferred projects.4 Furthermore, the expected disci-
plinary e®ect of bankruptcy threat associated with excess leverage is weakened because
of controlling shareholders' limited liability for insolvency of their subsidiaries in ad-
verse contingencies and smaller reputation losses due to the di±culty to pin down the
accountability in the complex opaque control web.
The presence of a second large shareholder might alleviate the power of the ultimate
owner. The literature on multiple large shareholders suggests that they either form
4Atanasov et al. (2009) provide several cases of expropriation of subsidiaries by parent companies.
For example, Enron was indebted to its subsidiary Enron Pipeline for $7.25 million at zero interest rate
in 1997, while Enron Pipeline had to pay interest rate between 9-12% on a loan to Enron.
2a coalition or cross-monitor each other.5 Conditional on the view that higher debt
is related to expropriation, the voting rights of the second largest shareholder will be
positively associated with leverage if the two largest shareholders collude, while the
relation will be negative if the second shareholder plays a monitoring role. Consistently
with Laeven and Levine (2008), multiple large shareholders are prevalent in our sample:
almost a half of the pyramids have second largest owner at the 10% ownership. We
¯nd a positive relation between the percentage of voting rights of the second largest
shareholder and leverage of pyramid ¯rms. When taking account of the voting rights of
the largest shareholder, leverage is negatively associated with a measure of \equality" of
the two largest shareholders. Small di®erence in ownership stakes of the ¯rst two largest
shareholders is associated with higher leverage. Overall, the evidence indicates that the
second largest shareholders with relatively larger voting power are more likely to collude
with the ¯rst controlling shareholders on capital structure decisions.
To test whether controlling shareholders prefer debt over equity in order to avoid
control dilution (Stulz (1988), Harris and Raviv (1988)), we examine family-controlled
pyramids where control is supposed to be valued most (Ellul (2008)). We ¯nd that
leverage ratios are lower in non-family-controlled pyramids compared to those of family-
controlled pyramids, which contradicts the control-enhancing mechanism story.6 Next,
higher debt might be a signal for avoidance of empire building by controlling shareholders
5Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) suggest that large shareholders compete to form controlling coali-
tion which will secure their private bene¯ts of control. Pagano and Roell (1998) focus on the possibility
that large shareholders cross-monitor each other, and Bloch and Hege (2001) argue that when ownership
is unevenly distributed monitoring is less likely.
6Ellul (2008) argue that family-controlled pyramids use less debt because pyramid structure and
debt are substitutable control enhancing mechanisms. The fact that in our sample pyramid ¯rms have
higher debt is inconsistent with the above argument.
3as suggested by Zwiebel (1996). The signalling hypothesis suggests that higher leverage
in pyramid ¯rms, compared to non-pyramid, can be attributed to their e®orts to reduce
free cash °ow problem using debt. Our results, however, show that pyramid ¯rms
with high free cash °ow do not use more debt than non-pyramid counterparts. Finally,
pyramids might maintain higher debt ratios for the purpose of tax reduction. Using
non-debt tax shield as a proxy for non-debt tax bene¯ts, we ¯nd that higher leverage
ratios in pyramids cannot be explained by tax considerations.7
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, our study contributes
to the capital structure literature by showing that higher levels of debt in pyramid
¯rms do not play a disciplinary role as they do in stand-alone ¯rms with dispersed
ownership structure (Berger et al. (1997)). The main reason is that pyramids, through
their complex control web, facilitate the transfer of resources among a±liated ¯rms.
The only related study is Faccio et al. (2003) who examine 14 European and East Asian
companies and suggest that controlling shareholders of group-a±liated ¯rms may use
debt to expropriate subsidiary shareholders by imposing higher leverage in ¯rms where
their cash °ow rights are low. Distinct from their work, our paper examines pyramid
¯rms in G7 economies considered to have equally developed market institutions. These
¯rms presumably do not highly rely on internal capital markets for ¯nancing as opposed
to ¯rms in underdeveloped economies, where external capital markets are incomplete and
su®er from informational problems and thus makes the use of internal capital markets
relatively more e±cient (Khanna and Yafeh (2007)). We also investigate alternative
7Following the literature, we assume that ¯rms treat interest expenses of debt that are tax deductable
and non-debt tax shields as substitutes.
4explanations of higher debt in pyramids, other than the expropriation hypothesis. In
particular, we o®er a richer set of tests of the signalling, the control enhancing, and the
tax reduction hypotheses.
Second, our work contributes to the empirical literature on multiple large sharehold-
ers. Only a handful of theoretical models study multiple large owners and corporate
valuations (Zwiebel (1995), Burkart et al. (1997), Gomes and Novaes (2005), Pagano
and Roell (1998)). Examining empirically the role of multiple large shareholders on
corporate valuation, Laeven and Levine (2008) ¯nd that there is a negative relationship
between the dispersion of cash-°ow rights across large owners and corporate valuations.
Similarly, Maury and Pajuste (2005) show that corporate valuation depends on the rel-
ative size of the large shareholders using a sample of Finnish ¯rms. We instead examine
the relationship between leverage and ownership structure in publicly traded ¯rms across
G7. To our knowledge, this is the ¯rst empirical study on the impact of multiple large
owners on capital structure decisions in pyramid ¯rms. Consistently with a theoretical
argument proposed by Zwiebel (1995), we ¯nd that the relationship between capital
structure and multiple large owners depends on the relative size of the voting rights of
the largest shareholders.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and document
the ownership patterns and ¯rm characteristics in the sample. Section 3 tests the rela-
tionship between complex ownership structure and capital structure. Section 4 presents
results of test of the expropriation hypothesis and Section 5 discusses the role of the
second largest owner. The alternative hypotheses can be found in Section. 6Section 7
5addresses endogeneity issues. Section 8 concludes.
2 Data and Sample
To examine the relationship between ownership structure and leverage, we use ¯rm-level
ownership data from the OSIRIS database provided by Bureau Van Dijk. The initial
sources of information are from World'Vest Base, Fitch, Thomson Financial, Reuters,
and Moody's. We retrieve the name of shareholders, their type and the percentage
of shareholdings reported once during the period 2003 to 2006 for listed ¯rms in G7
countries (Canada, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, and USA).8
In the analysis we consider only ¯rms with consolidated balance sheets to ensure
consistency in the reporting of debt across countries (Faccio et al. (2003)).9 The US
¯rms comprise 43% of the whole sample, followed by the Japanese (20%) and the British
¯rms (16%). We exclude 1,737 ¯rms in the ¯nancial sector (SIC 6000-6999) and 277
¯rms in the utility sector (SIC 4900-4999). Firms with total assets less than US$ 10
million are omitted. As a result of this screening, our ¯nal sample consists of 20,072
¯rm-years and 12,167 ¯rms.
8We focus on G7 countries because these countries share similar level of development of capital
markets. In emerging markets, groups are found to play an important role in ¯rm ¯nancing by providing
funds to ¯nancially constrained and distressed ¯rms with high growth opportunities (Claessens et al.
(2006)). To isolate the e®ect of internal markets on debt ¯nancing, we study only a sample of countries
where groups are less likely to play the role of an internal market.
9Consolidated balance sheets exclude inter-group loans. The debt ratio represents the external debt
¯nancing.
62.1 Ownership Patterns
The OSIRIS data reports the percentage of ownership for each shareholder only once for
the period 2003-2006. Based on shareholders' voting rights, we distinguish among several
ownership structures presented in Table 1. An ultimate owner is de¯ned as a shareholder
owning more than 20% direct or indirect voting rights (La Porta et al. (1999); Faccio and
Lang (2002)).10 If a ¯rm has such an ultimate owner, we classify it as ultimately owned
¯rm. In our sample, 42.94% of the ¯rms are classi¯ed as ultimately owned. France
and Germany are the countries with the highest percentage of ultimately owned ¯rms,
93.72% and 92.71% respectively. Faccio and Lang (2002) also document that the highest
incidence of controlled ownership in their European sample is in Germany and France.
The lowest percentage of ultimately owned ¯rms is in Japan (16.20%). Examining a
sample of East Asian countries, Claessens et al. (2006) ¯nd that the average ownership
in Japan is 5.13% and the control share is 10.05% over the period 1994-1996.
Widely held ¯rms are classi¯ed as ¯rms with no shareholders holding more than 20%
equity ownership. These ¯rms comprise 57.06% of our sample. The lowest percentages
of widely held ¯rms are in France (6.28%), Germany (7.29%), and Italy (15.46%). For a
sample of Western European corporations, Faccio and Lang (2002) also document that
the lowest percentages of widely held ¯rms are in Germany and Italy.
We de¯ne a pyramid ¯rm as an ultimately owned ¯rm at the 20% (or 10%) threshold
that also directly or indirect own one or more subsidiary companies. At the 20% thresh-
old, 35.01% of all ¯rms are in a pyramid structure. Pyramid distribution varies across
10The cuto® point of 10% and 20% are conventionally used in the literature because, they provide a
signi¯cant threshold of votes. In addition, most countries require a disclosure of 10% or more ownership.
7countries. In Canada, for example, pyramids comprise 31.27% of the listed companies,
which is comparable to the percentage of pyramids reported by Gadhoum (2006). The
highest percentage of pyramids is in Italy (81.16%) and the lowest percentage is in Japan
(6.56%).
Lowering the cuto® level of control from 20% to 10% increases the fraction of pyra-
mids to 47.57%. The most dramatic increase in the fraction of pyramids is in UK where
43.67% of all ¯rms are associated with pyramid structure at the 20% threshold and the
fraction goes up to 65.35% at the 10% threshold. The patterns of various ownership
structures across countries in our data are generally consistent with previous studies.
Enriques and Volpin (2007), analyzing concentrated ownership in Europe, conclude that
pyramids are typical mechanisms of control in France, Germany and Italy. Overall, the
controlled ownership via pyramid in our sample is concentrated in European companies
and to a smaller extent it is observed in Canada and the US.
Depending on the type of the ultimate owner at the 20% threshold, we identify ¯ve
types of pyramids. We rely on the OSIRIS de¯nitions of shareholder type, according to
which there are family (including individuals), industrial company, ¯nancial company
(including banks and insurance companies), mutual fund (including pension funds, trust
and private equity), and miscellaneous (state-owned, undisclosed) types of controlling
owners.11 The most prevalent types of ultimate owners in pyramids are an \industrial
company" (37.66%), \family" (36.05%) and \¯nancial ¯rm" (6.53%). The highest per-
centage of family control is concentrated in Italy (44.05%), while family pyramids are
11The distributions of pyramids controlled by mutual fund and miscellaneous owners are not reported.
8the least prevalent in Japan (5.70%).12
Similar to Laeven and Levine (2008), we identify pyramids with second largest owner
at 10% and 20% level of control. Table 1 indicates that 48.92% of all pyramids have a
second largest owner at the 10% level. Increasing the cuto® point for the second largest
owner to 20% decreases the share of pyramids with such type of shareholders to 25.8%.
Germany, Italy and France have the highest fraction of pyramids with second largest
shareholders.
2.2 Firm Characteristics
Leverage is a®ected by pro¯tability, asset tangibility, market-to-book ratio, and ¯rm
size (Rajan and Zingales (1995); Booth et al. (2001)). Table 2 summarizes descriptive
statistics of these ¯nancial characteristics across countries over the period 2003-2006.
Book leverage ratio is de¯ned as the ratio of long-term and short term debt to the book
value of equity and debt, and market leverage use market equity instead of book equity.
On average book leverage is 33.64% and market leverage is 24.06% over the period 2003-
2006. In our sample, Italian ¯rms are the most levered (42.53%) and the US ¯rms have
the lowest level of leverage (31.74%). Rajan and Zingales (1995) conduct a study on
leverage across G7 countries in which the level of leverage in the US in 1991 is similar
to the level reported in our sample over the period 2003-2006. The Canadian ¯rms
have decreased slightly their book leverage levels from 36% in 1991 (Rajan and Zingales
12Faccio and Lang (2002) de¯ne a family controlled ¯rm to be \a family or a ¯rm that is unlisted on
any stock exchange." Unlike them, we consider only families that hold shares in listed companies, which
potentially explains the lower percentage of family-controlled ¯rms in our sample. Faccio and Lang
(2002) document that 64.82% of their ultimately owned ¯rms are family owned at the 20% threshold,
while 32.36% of all ¯rms in our sample are ultimately owned by a family at this threshold.
9(1995)) to almost 33% for the 2003-2006 period.
Market-to-book ratio is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity.
The average value of market-to-book ratios hides a signi¯cant variation across countries.
Japanese ¯rms have the lowest market-to-book ratio (1.79) and the US ¯rms have the
highest one (3.04). Operating pro¯tability is de¯ned as the ratio of earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets. The average French ¯rm
is the most pro¯table (9.81%) and the US one is the least pro¯table (4.19%). Tangibility
is the ratio of ¯xed assets to total assets. On average the level of tangibility is 26.41%,
with Canadian ¯rms exhibiting the highest level of \tangibility" (40.87%) and French
¯rms exhibiting the lowest level (18.30%).
Table 3 provides ¯rm level mean statistics for pyramid and non-pyramid ¯rm. On
average pyramids have 7.65% more leverage than non-pyramids. Compared to non-
pyramid ¯rms, pyramids have signi¯cantly lower market-to-book ratio, more operating
pro¯tability, less tangible assets. In terms of debt and equity issuance, pyramids ¯rms
issue relatively more debt and less equity than non-pyramids.
3 Regression Results
3.1 Baseline Regression
We ¯rst test the impact of ¯rm characteristics on capital structure across the G7 coun-
tries. Following Rajan and Zingales (1995), we estimate the following regression model:
Leverageit = ® + ¯1Profitabilityit¡1 + ¯2Tangibilityt¡1 (1)
+¯3M=Bit¡1 + ¯4log(Sales)it¡1 + ²it:
10where leverage is book (market) leverage and pro¯tability, tangibility, M=B, log(Sales)
are ¯rm characteristic variables de¯ned in the previous section.
The model controls for industry, year and country ¯xed e®ect to capture heterogene-
ity across industry, year and country. Table 4 reports the OLS estimates with standard
errors adjusted for possible dependence at the ¯rm level and heteroskedasticity. These
estimations allow for the correlation within ¯rms, but require independence across ¯rms.
Petersen (2008) shows that the standard errors clustered at the ¯rm level are unbiased
in presence of correlation within ¯rms.
Overall, the estimates of ¯rm characteristics are consistent with previous research
such as Rajan and Zingales (1995), and Booth et al. (2001). The negative coe±cient
on pro¯tability is consistent with the hypothesis that more pro¯table ¯rms have larger
amount of internal funds and thus demand less debt. The tangibility of assets has a
positive coe±cient, which is consistent with the view that ¯rms with more tangible
assets have more debt because tangible assets can serve as collateral. Market-to-book
has a negative e®ect on capital structure. The negative coe±cient on the market-to-book
ratio is consistent with Myers (1977) that ¯rms with high future growth opportunities
use less debt. Logarithm of net sales, a proxy for size, is positively related to leverage
because larger ¯rms are less likely to go bankrupt and have more debt capacity.
The pooled regression assumes common coe±cients across all countries. Although
G7 countries have developed markets, they also experience large institutional di®erences
which might be responsible for di®erences in capital structure and its determinants.
Another reason for accounting for cross-country variation is that the U.S. ¯rms comprise
1143% of our sample, which might dominate the results in the pooled speci¯cation. Table
4 shows the results from the estimation of the leverage regression for each country. The
e®ects of ¯rm characteristics on leverage are similar across the seven countries. More
pro¯table ¯rms have lower leverage. Firms with more tangible assets borrow more. High
growth ¯rms use less debt than low growth ¯rms, and large ¯rms use more debt than
small ¯rms.
3.2 The Impact of Pyramid Structure on Leverage
To examine capital structures of pyramid and non-pyramid ¯rms, we estimate the fol-
lowing model:
Leverageit = ® + Pyramidi + Controlsit¡1 + ²it: (2)
where Pyramid is a dummy which equals to one if a ¯rm is a±liated to a pyramidal group
and zero otherwise; Controls include Profitability, Tangibility, M=B, Log(Sales),
country, industry, and time dummies. The tests are based on the assumption that pyra-
mid a±liation is exogeneous in the relatively short period. This assumption is reasonable
given that the literature agrees that ownership formation is historically determined to
a large extent (La Porta et al. (1999)). To address a potential critique that capital
structure choice by pyramids may be endogenous, as a robustness check we employ a
nonparametric matching approach which compares leverage ratios of pyramid and non-
pyramid ¯rms without imposing a linear functional form of the conditional leverage
expectations.13
13The results are presented in Section 7.
124 Expropriation Hypothesis
Controlling shareholders in a pyramidal group have high voting power but low cash °ow
rights in a±liates located at the bottom of the pyramid structure. This wedge creates
incentives to shift resources from the bottom to the top where controlling shareholders
have more cash °ow rights. This resource shifting activity, called tunneling (Johnson
et al. (2000)), includes a wealth transfer among a±liated ¯rms via transfer pricing,
usage of assets of one group member as collateral for another, in°ated payments for
intangibles such as patents, brand names and insurance. Bertrand et al. (2002), Bae
et al. (2002), Joh (2003), and Baek et al. (2006) provide evidence of expropriation of
minority shareholders by ultimate owners within groups.
Controlling shareholders, who do not bear the full cost of ¯nancial distress of their
a±liates because of the low cash °ow rights and the limited liabilities, have incentives to
exercise discretion over substantial pool of resources. They may expropriate by imposing
higher debt levels in ¯rms where their cash °ow rights are low and roll it over to a±liates
where they can have the resources on their disposal (Faccio et al. (2003)). They may
deploy the borrowed funds to their own preferred projects without being detected by
outsiders due to the complex control web in pyramids. We hypothesize that pyramid
¯rms use debt to secure private bene¯ts (expropriation hypothesis). In particular, under
this hypothesis we expect pyramids to have higher leverage compared to non-pyramids.
Table 5 reports results of book and market leverage regressions for ¯rms a±liated
to a pyramidal group at the 20% level of control. Column (1) shows that the pyramid
dummy has a signi¯cant positive coe±cient of 5.64 percentage points. Pyramid ¯rms
13use more debt than non-pyramids. The regression using market leverage ratio yields
a similar result (column 4). We conduct a number of tests to examine whether higher
debt levels in pyramids are explained by the expropriation hypothesis. In particular, we
investigate whether pyramid ¯rms have lower leverage in countries; where it is harder
to expropriate and whether pyramid ¯rms with higher level of asymmetric information
use more debt; and whether ultimate owners impose more debt on pyramid ¯rms than
stand-aline ¯rms under their control.
4.1 Creditor Rights Protection
La Porta et al. (2000) argue that it is harder for controlling shareholders to expropriate
outside creditors in countries with stronger creditor rights protection. If debt facilitates
expropriation in pyramid ¯rms, lower leverage is expected for pyramids in countries
with better protection of creditor rights. We classify the countries into stronger and
weaker creditor rights countries based on the creditor rights index developed by La Porta
et al. (1998). Stronger creditor protection countries include UK, Germany, Italy, and
Japan, while the weaker creditor protection countries are Canada, U.S., and France.14 A
creditor rights dummy, that is one for stronger protection countries and zero for weaker
protection countries, an interactive term between the creditor rights dummy, and the
pyramid dummy are added to the baseline regression.
Table 5 columns (2) and (5) show a positive coe±cient on the pyramid dummy,
14The reorganization and liquidation rules in Canada, USA, and France o®er more protection to
management against secured creditors. For example, the automatic stay on the assets of the ¯rm in the
reorganization procedure prevent secured creditors from possessing loan collateral. Canada, USA, and
France have weaker protection of creditor rights.
14indicating that pyramid ¯rms generally use more debt than non-pyramid ¯rms after
controlling for di®erences in legal environments. The positive coe±cient on creditor
rights dummy suggests a higher debt ratio in countries with better creditor rights pro-
tections. The negative coe±cient on the interactive term of creditor protection and the
pyramid dummy suggests that pyramid ¯rms in better creditor rights protection coun-
tries use less debt. This result is consistent with the expropriation hypothesis because it
is harder for controlling shareholders to extract private bene¯ts using debt in countries
with better protections to creditor rights.
4.2 Asymmetric Information
The risk of expropriation may be more pronounced when the asymmetric information
between corporate insiders and outsiders is severe. It is more likely for controlling
shareholders in opaque ¯rms to extract private bene¯ts without being easily detected by
outsiders. Small ¯rms generally face higher degree of information asymmetry than large
¯rms because of less available public information. Small pyramid ¯rms, therefore, are
expected to have higher leverage if debt is used by controlling shareholders to facilitate
expropriation.
We add ¯rm size as a proxy for asymmetric information and include a pyramid
dummy, a size dummy and also the interaction term of the two dummies to the speci-
¯cation. Large Firms takes the value of one if a ¯rm's size is higher than the sample
median and zero otherwise. Table 5 columns (3) and (6) show that the coe±cient on size
dummy is 1:507 and the coe±cient on the interaction term, Large Firms£Pyramid, is
negative and signi¯cant ¡4:195. This result suggests that small pyramids have higher
15leverage relative to large pyramids as predicted by the expropriation hypothesis. Higher
level of asymmetric information allows controlling shareholders of small pyramid ¯rms
to make decisions for their own bene¯ts and increases the risk of expropriation.
4.3 Pyramid and Controlled Stand-Alone Firms
Our analysis so far does not take into consideration that ultimate owner may directly
control more than one ¯rm. For example, an ultimate owner may control more than one
pyramid as shown in Figure 1 or an ultimate owner may directly control only stand-alone
¯rms, i.e., ¯rms that do not have subsidiaries (Figure 2). Equally plausible, an ultimate
owner may control both stand alone and group-a±liated ¯rms as depicted in Figure 3.
Comparing capital structures of stand-alone and pyramid ¯rms controlled by the
same ultimate owners provides an additional test of the expropriation hypothesis. Ulti-
mate owners capture all bene¯ts and bear full costs of the controlled stand-alone ¯rms
based on their ownership stakes, and therefore have relatively lower incentives and abil-
ity to use debt to secure their private bene¯ts in these ¯rms. However, expropriation by
using higher debt is more obtainable in ¯rms having subsidiaries because of the ability
of ultimate owners to tunnel resources along the control chains. Hence, if debt facilitates
extraction of private bene¯ts, pyramid ¯rms are expected to have higher leverage ratios
than stand-alone ¯rms controlled by the same ultimate owner.15 To test this conjecture,
we focus only on the subset of ¯rms exhibiting ownership structure as shown in Figure
3.
15Note that the fully consolidated ¯nancial statement includes the external debt borrowed by sub-
sidiaries, but exclude the intergroup loans.
16In the G7 sample, 211 of the ultimate owners exhibit control simultaneously over
1860 pyramid and stand-alone ¯rms. We estimate regressions similar to those presented
in Table 5. The main focus from this exercise is on the estimate on the dummy variable
Conduit, that is one for pyramid ¯rms and zero for stand-alone ¯rms both controlled by
the same ultimate owner. The results in Table 6 show a positive and signi¯cant coe±cient
on the Conduit dummy. Pyramid ¯rms have higher leverage ratio than stand-alone ¯rms
controlled by the same ultimate owners, which supports the expropriation hypothesis,
i.e., controlling shareholders appear to impose more debt on pyramid ¯rms rather than
on stand-alone ¯rms.
5 The Role of the Second Largest Shareholder
Our results suggest that higher debt ratios in pyramid ¯rms is consistent with the
expropriation motive explanation. A signi¯cant fraction of ¯rms in the sample have a
second large shareholder owning more than 10% voting rights. Previous research suggests
that the presence of a second large shareholder could a®ect the ¯rm's investment and
valuation. In this section, we examine whether the second largest shareholder a®ects a
¯rm's debt policy.
Theory o®ers at least two views on the role of second largest shareholders. On the
one hand, Winton (1993) and Bolton and Thaden (1998) posit that shareholders with
signi¯cant stakes have incentives to monitor controlling shareholders to avoid pro¯t di-
version. Burkart et al. (1997) argue that a reduction in the ownership stake of controlling
shareholders weakens their incentives to monitor. Gomes and Novaes (2005) also show
17that bargaining problems among multiple controlling shareholders prevent decisions that
may harm small shareholders.
On the other hand, the second largest owner may have incentives to collude with the
largest shareholder to share private bene¯ts. Zwiebel (1995) assumes that the control
bene¯ts will be divided among di®erent controlling shareholders depending on the rela-
tive size of their respective blocks. Therefore, if one block is much smaller than the rest,
then the probability that the small blockholders can share private bene¯ts is reduced.
Maury and Pajuste (2005) develop a theoretical model which considers not only
the presence of multiple blockholders but also their relative size and identity. The
model predicts that high voting power increases private bene¯t extraction, while low
cash °ow ownership reduces the incentive e®ect. Hence, whether the second controlling
shareholders will monitor or collude with the largest shareholders on debt ¯nancing is
an empirical question.
In Table 7, we analyze the role of the second largest owner in a pyramid. Column
(1) shows that voting rights of the second largest owner are positively related to the
leverage of pyramid ¯rms.16 Increasing the second largest shareholder's voting rights
by one standard deviation increases the leverage ratios by 1.88 percent of its mean.
This ¯nding suggests that second largest owner with more voting rights is less likely to
monitor the ultimate owner in their debt ¯nancing choices. One potential explanation
is that these second largest owners can share relatively larger portion of the private
bene¯ts from exercising control over debt resources.
16In all speci¯cations in Table 7 we focus on ¯rms having second largest shareholders with voting
rights higher than 10%.
18To further test the role of the voting rights of shareholders, we use the ratio of
the di®erence in voting rights of the ¯rst and the second largest shareholders to the
sum of the voting rights of the ¯rst two shareholders ((V R1 ¡ V R2)=(V R1 + V R2)) to
measure the distribution of power. A small value of (V R1¡V R2)=(V R1+V R2) signi¯es
more equal distribution of the voting power between the two largest shareholders. The
negative sign on the coe±cient of this variable suggests that greater equality in terms
of voting rights is associated with higher leverage (column (2)). As robustness checks,
we estimate all speci¯cations using market leverage as a dependent variable (columns
(3)-(4)) and the results are similar to those using book leverage. The second largest
shareholder with relatively more voting rights is more likely to form a coalition with the
¯rst owner because having high voting rights ensures a large share of private bene¯ts.
In addition, we examine the e®ect of the second largest shareholders in family and
non-family pyramid ¯rms. Table 8, columns (1) and (3) show that the second largest
shareholder does not have a signi¯cant impact on the capital structure decisions when
the largest owner is a family. The coe±cients on the voting rights of the second owner
and on the measure of similarity between voting rights of the ¯rst two shareholders
are insigni¯cant in the regressions for family-controlled pyramids. The in°uence of the
second largest shareholder in capital structure decisions is only observed in non-family
¯rms (columns (2) and (4)).
To sum up, we ¯nd that the role of the second largest owner in capital structure
decisions depends not only on their voting rights, but on the voting rights and the type
of the largest owner as well. Large voting rights of the second largest owner do not
19necessarily guarantee that they will play an active role in ¯nancial policy. Interestingly,
we ¯nd that when the ultimate owner is a family, the second largest shareholder does
not a®ect debt ¯nancing decisions.
6 Alternative Explanations
There may be other possible explanations for higher leverage in pyramid. In this section,
we examine whether our results can be explained by the control-enhancing hypothesis,
the signalling hypothesis, or the tax-deducting hypothesis.
6.1 Control-Enhancing
Previous theoretical literature indicates that managers may choose such capital structure
that enhances their control (Harris and Raviv (1988), Stulz (1988), and Israel (1991)).
Using debt rather than equity allows controlling shareholders to keep their control ben-
e¯ts without share dilution. Ellul (2008) suggests that family controlling shareholders
value control most and use leverage strategically to enhance their voting power.
To test the control-enhancing hypothesis in our context, we examine capital structure
decisions of pyramid ¯rms controlled by families and non-families. We add to our baseline
regression a dummy variable that is one if a pyramid ¯rm is controlled by a family
and zero otherwise. Column (1) in Table 9 shows that the family pyramid dummy
has a negative coe±cient, indicating less debt is used in pyramid ¯rms controlled by
families. Ellul (2008) also ¯nds that family controlled pyramid ¯rms use less leverage
under pyramid structure. His interpretation, however, is that the pyramid structure
is a substitute for leverage as a control-enhancing mechanism. On the contrary, our
20¯nding that pyramid ¯rms use more debt than non-pyramid ¯rms does not support the
hypothesis that pyramid and leverage are substitutes (Table 5, column (1)).
As a further investigation, we ¯nd that family controlling shareholders in our sample
have lower voting rights than non-family owners. If debt is used for the purpose of secur-
ing control, pyramid ¯rms controlled by families with smaller stakes should have higher
leverage. In addition, the result that families, as the largest shareholders, do not use
signi¯cantly more debt in the presence of a second large shareholder (Table 8) is also
inconsistent with the control-enhancing hypothesis, because family controlling share-
holders are expected to use more debt to enhance control when there is a competition
for voting rights from second large shareholders.
Overall, the evidence of family-controlled pyramids using less debt is consistent with
the expropriation hypothesis. Family owners have weaker incentive to expropriate other
shareholders because they have a long-term commitment to the ¯rm and often want
to pass the ¯rm to next generations (Anderson et al. (2003)). The lower risk of ex-
propriation in family pyramid ¯rms explains their lower leverage ratios. Hence, the
expropriation hypothesis rather than the control-enhancing hypothesis better explains
the debt usage in pyramids.
6.2 Signaling
Zwiebel (1996) posits that managers of ¯rms with high free cash °ow can use debt as
a signal for their avoidance of empire building. If higher leverage in pyramid ¯rms can
be explained by the signalling hypothesis, we would expect more debt in pyramid ¯rms
with high free cash °ow than non-pyramids. A dummy variable, High FCF, that is one
21for a value higher than the sample median of free cash °ow and zero otherwise, and its
interaction with pyramid dummy are included in the regression.
The positive coe±cients on the High FCF dummy in Table 9 column (2) and (5)
suggest that on average ¯rms use more debt when facing more severe free cash °ow
problem. However, the coe±cient on the interactive term between the pyramid dummy
and the high free cash °ow dummy is insigni¯cant using book leverage ratio and is
negative at the 10% level of signi¯cance when using market leverage. These results
indicate that free cash °ow does not explain higher leverage in pyramid than non-pyramid
¯rms. There is no evidence that pyramids use more debt to signal reducing the risk of
free cash °ow.
6.3 Tax Reduction
The trade-o® theory of capital structure suggests that debt has tax bene¯ts because
of tax deductability of interest expenses. More pro¯table ¯rms may use more debt to
reduce their tax burden. To examine whether tax-deduction motive can explain the
higher leverage in pyramid ¯rms, we include non-debt tax shields and its interaction
with the pyramid dummy. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that the value of this tax
shield depends on corporate tax, the level of taxable pro¯ts, and on non-debt tax shields
such as capital allowances, tax credits and tax losses carried forward. Non-debt tax
shield is a proxy for corporate tax bene¯t if we assume that depreciation is a substitute
for interest payment. If incentives to reduce taxes drives capital structure decisions of
pyramid ¯rms, pyramids with higher non-debt tax shield are expected to use more debt
than non-pyramid counterparts.
22The negative coe±cients on the non-debt tax shields (Table 9 column (3) and (6))
suggest that on average ¯rms have lower leverage when they have other ways to reduce
taxes. However, the coe±cients on the interaction term of the non-debt tax shields and
the pyramid dummy are insigni¯cantly positive, indicating that pyramid ¯rms' debt
¯nancing policies are not mainly driven by tax consideration.
7 Endogeneity
One issue that arises from using simple OLS estimation of the leverage regression in
Table 5 is potential endogeneity of the pyramid indicator variable. Our results might be
driven by non-random sorting of pyramids across industries and/or countries. As shown
by the results in Table 3, pyramids di®er signi¯cantly from non-pyramids in terms of
their ¯rm characteristics, which con¯rms their non-random distribution in the sample.
In this section we perform non-parametric matching which accounts for endogeneity.
Non-parametric matching compares only pyramid and non-pyramid ¯rms with sim-
ilar observable characteristics.17 The advantage of non-parametric matching is that it
relaxes the assumption about the functional form of the leverage distribution.
We use propensity score matching models to estimate \the average treatment on the
treated" (ATT). The last is de¯ned as the di®erence between leverage ratios of ¯rms
that have \chosen" to be pyramids to leverage ratios of the same ¯rms if they would not
have chosen this \treatment." As the counterfactual mean leverage ratio for those being
treated is not observed, one has to choose a proper substitute for it in order to estimate
17For an application of matching technique in corporate ¯nance, see Li and Zhao (2006) who examine
abnormal returns related to the issuance of SEOs.
23the ATT. The matching approach aims at estimating the missing counterfactual of what
a pyramid's leverage would be if it were not pyramid. The answer is given by the leverage
of non-pyramid ¯rms with the same set of ¯rm characteristics.
There are several frequently used algorithms for matching \comparable" ¯rms.18
Traditional methods ¯nd matching ¯rms by each individual characteristic. To overcome
the curse of dimensionality that arises if the match has to consider a great number of
characteristics, we base our results on propensity score matching. It is the conditional
probability of being a pyramid that is estimated from a probability model (Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985)).
To estimate the ATT, we apply the most popular propensity score matching pro-
cedures, kernel, nearest neighborhood, and Mahalanobis-metric matching with replace-
ment.19 Kernel matching is based on the estimated propensity scores and takes local
averages of the untreated observations near each treated observation. Nearest neigh-
borhood compares leverage of ¯rms with close propensity scores as de¯ned by a neigh-
borhood metric. Mahalanobis matching consists of matching on speci¯c variables in
addition to the propensity score; it may decrease selection bias and may also serve as an
additional protection against any impact due to inconsistent estimation of the propensity
score.
Table 10 presents OLS estimates of a pyramid dummy in column (1) together with
estimated ATT from three types of matching. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported
18See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for detailed practical guidance on propensity score matching.
19To overcome the potential lack of overlap of propensity score between the pyramids and non-
pyramids (common support problem), we apply trimming constraint (5% trimming rule) as suggested
by Smith and Todd (2005).
24below the average treatment e®ects. The ATT estimates for each year are smaller than
the OLS-based pyramid estimates but remain large and are above zero with high levels
of statistical signi¯cance. These results con¯rm that even after comparing pyramids to
non-pyramids with similar characteristics the leverage di®erences still remain.20
8 Conclusions
This paper studies the in°uence of pyramid structure and multiple controlling share-
holders on corporate capital structure decisions. We document that over one-third of
the listed ¯rms in G7 countries are in pyramid ownership structures. Half of the pyra-
mid ¯rms have more than one large controlling shareholders. Pyramid ¯rms use more
debt than non-pyramid ¯rms. Our main explanation is that controlling shareholders in
pyramids use debt as a facilitating device to expropriate outsiders.
The ¯nding of higher leverage ratios in pyramid ¯rms is consistent with the expro-
priation hypothesis because: (i) pyramid ¯rms use less debt in countries with strong
protection of creditor rights compared to pyramids in countries with weak protection of
creditor rights, (ii) pyramids that are subject to more severe asymmetric information
problems have higher debt, (iii) pyramid ¯rms have more debt than stand-alone ¯rms
controlled by the same ultimate owners. The results from tests on other competing ex-
20We conduct diagnostic tests to assess the quality of the matching procedure. It has to be checked
whether the matching procedure is able to balance the distribution of the relevant variables in both the
control and the treatment group. As suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), we rely on t-tests to
compare di®erences in means for both treatment and control groups. It is expected that after matching
there will be no signi¯cant di®erences. In all cases the results con¯rm that there are no statistical
di®erences after the matching is applied. An alternative way to assess the matching quality is to
evaluate pseudo-R2 statistics before and after matching. In all cases there are no systematic di®erences
in the distribution of covariates after matching and the pseudo-R2 is close to zero (0.02, down from 0.2
before matching). Similar conclusions come from F-tests on the joint signi¯cance of all regressors. The
results are available upon request from the authors.
25planations indicate that debt is not used by pyramid ¯rms for the purposes of enhancing
control, signalling of restricting empire building or reducing taxes.
Voting rights of the second shareholders are positively related to debt ratios. The
more equally distributed the voting rights between the two largest shareholders, the
higher are the leverage ratios. This evidence suggests that second largest owners who
can obtain a greater portion of the private bene¯ts increase the usage of debt, which is
in favor of the expropriation story.
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35Table 6: Comparison of Pyramid and Controlled Stand-alone Firms
This table reports the estimates from OLS regressions where the dependent variables are book
and market leverage of ¯rms a±liated with pyramids. Book leverage is the book value of debt
to book value of equity and debt. Book leverage is long-term debt and short-term debt. Market
leverage is de¯ned in a similar way; instead of book equity, market equity is included. The sample
is restricted only to those ultimate owners that control simultaneously stand-alone (no subsidiaries)
and pyramids ¯rms at the 20% level. Conduit is de¯ned for each ultimate owner. It is a dummy
variable, which equals to 1 if ¯rms are a±liated to a pyramidal group controlled by the same ultimate
owner at the 20% cuto® point and 0 if they are stand-alone ¯rms. is otherwise. Profitability is
earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation divided by total assets. log(Sales) is logarithm of
net sales. Tangibility denotes net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. Market-
to-book ratio (M=B) is de¯ned as market equity divided by book equity. The estimates of constant,
industry, and time dummies are not reported. Robust standard errors (clustered at the ¯rm level)
are reported in brackets. *** denotes 1% signi¯cant level, ** denotes 5% signi¯cant level, and *
denotes 10% signi¯cant level.














36Table 7: Leverage and the Second Largest Owner
This table reports the estimates from OLS regressions where the dependent variables are book
and market leverage of ¯rms a±liated with pyramids. Book leverage is the book value of debt
to book value of equity and debt. Book leverage is long-term debt and short-term debt. Market
leverage is de¯ned in a similar way; instead of book equity, market equity is included. V R1 (V R2)
is the percentage shareholdings of the largest (second largest) owner. Profitability is earnings
before interest, taxes, and depreciation divided by total assets. log(Sales) is logarithm of net sales.
Tangibility denotes net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. Market-to-book ratio
(M=B) is de¯ned as market equity divided by book equity. The estimates of constant, industry,
country and time dummies are not reported. Robust standard errors (clustered at the ¯rm level)
are reported in brackets. *** denotes 1% signi¯cant level, ** denotes 5% signi¯cant level, and *
denotes 10% signi¯cant level.
Book Leverage Market Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
V R2 0.121* 0.06*
[0.065] [0.03]
(V R1 ¡ V R2)=(V R1 + V R2) -0.060* -0.036*
[0.033] [0.02]
Profitabilityt¡1 -0.128 -0.12 -0.191*** -0.194***
[0.183] [0.191] [0.054] [0.056]
Tangibilityt¡1 0.213*** 0.194*** 0.344*** 0.333***
[0.048] [0.050] [0.033] [0.034]
M=Bt¡1 -0.431* -0.441 -0.475*** -0.458***
[0.251] [0.269] [0.123] [0.131]
log(Sales)t¡1 1.657*** 1.642*** 0.797** 0.885**
[0.487] [0.518] [0.342] [0.361]
Observations 2940 2754 2853 2674
Firms 1264 1184 1239 1161
R2 0.04 0.03 0.14 0.14
37Table 8: Leverage of Family and non-Family Pyramids
This table reports the estimates from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is book leverage.
Book leverage is the book value of debt to book value of equity and debt. Book debt is long-term
debt and short-term debt. V R1(V R2) is the percentage holdings of the largest (second largest)
owner.Profitability is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation divided by total assets.
log(Sales) is logarithm of net sales. Tangibility denotes net property, plant and equipment divided
by total assets. Market-to-book ratio (M=B) is de¯ned as market equity divided by book equity.
The estimates of constant, industry, country and time dummies are not reported. Robust standard
errors (clustered at the ¯rm level) are reported in brackets. *** denotes 1% signi¯cant level, **
denotes 5% signi¯cant level, and * denotes 10% signi¯cant level.
Family Non-Family Family Non-Family
Pyramid Pyramid Pyramid Pyramid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
V R2 0.066 0.206**
[0.097] [0.086]
(V R1 ¡ V R2)=(V R1 + V R2) -0.029 -0.143**
[0.043] [0.056]
Profitabilityt¡1 -0.126 -0.083 -0.107 -0.093
[0.306] [0.098] [0.304] [0.108]
Tangibilityt¡1 0.225*** 0.199*** 0.181** 0.192***
[0.086] [0.053] [0.086] [0.056]
M=Bt¡1 -0.338 -0.498* -0.254 -0.621*
[0.407] [0.300] [0.418] [0.342]
log(Sales)t¡1 1.085 1.955*** 0.99 2.091***
[0.742] [0.575] [0.762] [0.628]
Observations 1379 1561 1324 1430
Firms 584 680 559 625
R2 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.07
38Table 9: Regressions: Alternative Explanations
This table reports the estimates from OLS regressions of book leverage on pyramid dummy, variables
that might a®ect leverage, and the interactive terms. Book leverage is the book value of debt to
book value of equity and debt. Book debt is long-term debt and short-term debt. Pyramid is a
dummy which equals to 1 if a ¯rm is a±liated to a pyramidal group at the 20% cuto® point and
0 otherwise. FamilyPyramid is a dummy which equals to 1 if a pyramid ¯rm is controlled by a
family and 0 otherwise. HighFCF is a dummy variables taking the value of one for values higher
than the sample median, and zero otherwise. FCF is operating income before depreciation minus
interest expense, taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends divided by total assets. Log
sales is the logarithm of net sales. NDT is non-debt tax shield de¯ned as the ratio of depreciation
to pro¯t before depreciation, interest and taxes. The estimates of pro¯tability, tangibility, market-
to-book, sales, constant, industry, country and time dummies are not reported. Robust standard
errors (clustered at the ¯rm level) are reported in brackets. *** denotes 1% signi¯cant level, **
denotes 5% signi¯cant level, and * denotes 10% signi¯cant level.
Book Leverage Market Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FamilyPyramid -4.165*** -1.964**
[1.456] [0.940]
Pyramid 5.106*** 6.113*** 3.373*** 4.540***
[1.359] [1.024] [0.870] [0.622]
HighFCF 2.196*** 2.576***
[0.800] [0.519]




Pyramid £ NDTt¡1 0.011 0.003
[0.010] [0.006]
Profitabilityt¡1 -0.108 -0.217*** -0.200*** -0.106*** -0.124*** -0.144***
[0.068] [0.035] [0.033] [0.025] [0.015] [0.015]
Tangibilityt¡1 0.194*** 0.276*** 0.274*** 0.273*** 0.277*** 0.249***
[0.035] [0.018] [0.018] [0.024] [0.013] [0.013]
M=Bt¡1 -0.266* -0.189* -0.136 -0.548*** -0.519*** -0.502***
[0.148] [0.098] [0.101] [0.075] [0.041] [0.042]
log(Sales)t¡1 1.705*** 2.390*** 2.397*** 1.060*** 1.675*** 1.509***
[0.335] [0.182] [0.179] [0.238] [0.124] [0.121]
Observations 6291 20069 18781 6120 19851 18580
Firms 2632 7875 7655 2567 7794 7655
R2 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.16
39Table 10: Propensity Score Matching
Column (1) reports the coe±cients of a pyramid dummy from yearly book leverage regression
speci¯ed in Table 5, column (1). Columns (2) and (3) show the average treatment on the treated
(ATT) over the common support. Standard errors are reported in brackets. The standard errors of
ATT parameters are bootstrapped. *** denotes 1% signi¯cant level
Year OLS ATT(Propensity Score)
Mahalanobis Kernel N. Neighborhood
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2004 5.4*** 3.44*** 3.57*** 3.74***
[1.13] [1.53] [1.51] [1.69]
2005 5.4*** 3.62*** 5.25*** 2.78***
[1.15] [1.47] [2.49] [1.58]
2006 6.25*** 2.75*** 4.16*** 3.79***
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